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Abstract— This paper brings the novel idea of paying the
utility to the winning agents in terms of some physical entity
in cooperative communications. Our setting is a secret two-
way communication channel where two transmitters exchange
information in the presence of an eavesdropper. The relays are
selected from a set of interested parties, such that the secrecy
sum rate is maximized. In return, the selected relay nodes’
energy harvesting requirements will be fulfilled up to a certain
threshold through their own payoff so that they have the natural
incentive to be selected and involved in the communication.
However, relays may exaggerate their private information in
order to improve their chance to be selected. Our objective is to
develop a mechanism for relay selection that enforces them to
reveal the truth since otherwise they may be penalized. We also
propose a joint cooperative relay beamforming and transmit
power optimization scheme based on an alternating optimization
approach. Note that the problem is highly non-convex, since
the objective function appears as a product of three correlated
Rayleigh quotients. While a common practice in the existing
literature is to optimize the relay beamforming vector for given
transmit power via rank relaxation, we propose a second-order
cone programming-based approach in this paper, which requires
a significantly lower computational task. The performance of the
incentive control mechanism and the optimization algorithm has
been evaluated through numerical simulations.
Index Terms— Cooperative beamforming, energy harvesting,
mechanism design, secrecy, two-way relay.
I. INTRODUCTION
RELAYING is a promising technique to extend wire-less coverage and increase the achievable rate [1]–[4],
and in recent years it has also been recognized as a
spectrally efficient way to exchange information over dis-
tance between two transceivers via two-way relaying [5]–[8].
Relays, if used collaboratively, can also form focused signal
or noise beams to provide physical-layer security [3], [4], [9].
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Collaborative relays follow the same idea as multiple anten-
nas to exploit the spatial degrees of freedom for enhanc-
ing the signals to the legitimate receiver and worsening
the interception of the eavesdropper by transmitting artificial
noises [10]–[13].
There is a huge scope of research for selecting the best relay
nodes in maximizing the system performance. A meaningful
setting would be to let the selected relays earn some form
of revenue for relaying others’ information. In this case,
challenge arises because the candidates may behave selfishly
to maximize their own revenues. To tackle this, game theory
is a popular tool to analyze the conflict of interests among
intelligent rational competitors [14]–[16]. Auction and pricing
schemes were proposed for efficient selection of a social
choice, but most of them were based on the assumption that
the players are honest and ready to disclose their true private
information [15], [16], which may not be the case in practice.
Also, in the literature, the “revenues” are usually some abstract
quantities that may not be meaningful [15]–[19].
Nevertheless, a recent development in wireless communi-
cations, which promotes energy transfer over wireless chan-
nels, may be the answer to help quantify the revenues
one may gain from contributing to others’ communications.
Through simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT), mobile users are provided with access to both
energy and data at the same time which brings enormous
prospects of new applications [20]–[25]. The concept of
SWIPT was first introduced in [20] in a single noisy line,
and later extended in [21] to frequency-selective channels.
Practical SWIPT schemes, namely, time switching and power
splitting, have also been proposed [22], [23]. Recent studies
further considered the combination of SWIPT with physical-
layer security [24], [25], one-way relaying [26], and two-way
relaying [27].
The focus of this paper is fundamentally different from the
literature. While we consider relay selection for a two-way
communication system in which two nodes exchange infor-
mation with the help of a set of relay nodes in the presence
of an eavesdropper, rather than concentrating primarily on
reaping the benefits of relaying for secrecy communications,
our aim is to develop an efficient mechanism to ensure that the
relays reveal their true private information for relay selection
optimization. In this particular problem, the channel coeffi-
cients from a relay to the two sources and the eavesdropper
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are regarded as the private information of that relay. The
participation of relays is incentivised by the possible energy
earning from the sources. In particular, the source transmitters
will ensure that the energy harvesting requirements of the
selected relays are fulfilled up to a certain threshold (or the
expected payoff level).
The problem is that under this setup, the relays may exag-
gerate their private information to improve their chance to be
selected, hoping to maximize their energy earning. The objec-
tive for a self-enforcing truth-revealing mechanism is to ensure
that the relays reveal their actual private information to avoid
being punished to pay for any damage caused. Note that mech-
anism design approaches have already been considered for
suppressing cheating in cognitive radio networks [17], wireless
video caching [18], and one-way relaying [19]. However,
in [17]–[19], the revenue was paid in terms of some virtual
entity, which does not directly relate to the concerned partici-
pants, while in this paper, the revenue is physically defined as
harvested energy. In the context of energy harvesting facility
considered in this paper, it is assumed that only the selected
relays can harvest their required energy, and the unselected
relay nodes will harvest almost nothing. It is also assumed that
the relays will participate in the mechanism, as is common in
conventional relaying [3]–[6], even in the absence of dedicated
energy transmission. However, there is no guard mechanism
to prevent any relay from announcing its undermined channel
condition in an attempt not to be selected so it can harvest
energy without paying any penalty. In that case, the relay may
remain unselected even with a better channel condition. But
the reality is that the channel state information (CSI) of each
relay is its own private information and none of the relays
actually knows the channel conditions of the other relays.
Hence none of them can define any threshold downplaying
by which may guarantee its non-selection. Although it may
be generally assumed that any unselected relay will be able to
harvest some extent of energy, there is no guarantee that the
harvested energy would be above a useful level. Thus the key
motivation for the relays to participate in the mechanism is that
through the proposed mechanism they yield QoS guarantee
(at least minimum incentive) in terms of energy earning.
On the other hand, the unselected relays have no such
guarantee.
With the mechanism, we then propose a joint collaborative
relay beamforming and transmit power optimization scheme
for maximizing the sum secrecy rate while guaranteeing the
expected payoff of each selected relay node in the form of
its harvested energy. The optimization problem appears to be
highly non-convex as the objective function is a product of
three correlated Rayleigh quotients. While a common practice
tends to optimize the collaborative relay beamforming vector
for a given transmit power using rank relaxation, our proposed
approach requires no rank relaxation. Instead, we formu-
late the relay beamforming problem as a second-order cone
program (SOCP), which has lower computational overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest work in the
existing literature to this paper can be found in [19].
However, our contribution is three-fold compared to the work
in [19]. Firstly, we consider two-way amplify-and-forward
relaying, whereas one-way decode-and-forward (DF) relaying
was considered in [19]. The DF relaying vastly simplifies
the utility characterization for mechanism design. Hence the
system model is different. Secondly, we define the utility of
the auctioneers (relays) in terms of some practically appealing
quantity (harvested energy) as opposed to the virtual payment
considered in [19] and many other existing works [18]. Note
that the virtual payment system does not provide enough
incentives to the players for participating in the auction.
Thirdly, in addition to the incentive controlling mechanism
design, we develop an optimal joint transmit power and
relay beamforming design algorithm whereas [19] considered
only truthful mechanism design for relay selection. We also
note that collaborative relay beamforming problems for
two-way relay systems were studied in [3] and [4] but with
a fixed number of relays, and without mechanism design and
payments for the selected relays in terms of harvested energy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, the system model for a two-way relay network
in the presence of an eavesdropper is described. Truth-telling
mechanism design strategies are then briefly introduced in
Section III. The joint-optimal collaborative relay beamform-
ing and transmit power optimization algorithm is developed
in Section IV. Section V presents the simulation results to
illustrate the importance of the proposed mechanism design
and we conclude the paper in Section VI.
Notations—Throughout the paper, boldface lowercase and
uppercase letters are used to represent vectors and matrices,
respectively. The symbol In denotes an n × n identity matrix,
while 0 is a zero vector or matrix. Also, AT , AH , A†, tr(A),
rank(A), and det(A) represent transpose, the Hermitian (conju-
gate) transpose, matrix projection, trace, rank and determinant
of a matrix A, respectively; ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean norm;
A  0 (A  0) means that A is a Hermitian positive semidef-
inite (definite) matrix; [A]i, j denotes the (i, j)th element of
A. The notation x ∼ CN (μ,) means that x is a random
vector following a complex circularly symmetric Gaussian
distribution with the mean vector μ and the covariance matrix
of .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a two-way relay network consisting of two
sources, S1 and S2, wishing to communicate with each other,
N relay nodes, {Ri }Ni=1, and an eavesdropper, E, as illustrated
in Fig. 1. There is no direct link between the two source nodes,
so communication has to be done via the relays. Assuming
the more practical half-duplex relays, the communication is
accomplished in two time slots. In the first time slot, the source
nodes broadcast their signals s1 and s2 to all the relay nodes.
In the second time slot, the source nodes decide which of those
N relays will be selected to forward their messages to the
corresponding destination nodes based on some predesigned
mechanism which we will describe later. During the whole
process, the eavesdropper node overhears the messages from
the source nodes as well as the relay nodes. The source nodes
aim at maximizing the secrecy sum-rate by properly selecting
K ≤ N relay nodes. It is assumed that each relay node only
knows its own CSI between itself and the transmitters as well
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Fig. 1. Two-way relay system in the presence of an eavesdropper.
as the eavesdropper. The relays then report their CSI to the
mechanism designer (which may be one of the two sources or
a centralized processor)1 as their bids to be selected.
The messages, s1 and s2, transmitted from the sources
need to be kept confidential to E. It is assumed that s1 and
s2 ∼ CN (0, 1), and the transmit power from S1 and S2 is,
respectively, ps,1 and ps,2. In the first time slot, the received
signals at Ri and E are, respectively, given by
yr,i = √ps,1h1,i s1 + √ps,2h2,i s2 + nr,i , for i = 1, . . . , N,
(1)
y(1)e =
√
ps,1h1,es1 + √ps,2h2,es2 + n(1)e , (2)
where hi, j for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , N, denote the
complex channel gains between Si and R j and hi,e for
i = 1, 2, are that between Si and E, nr,i ∼ CN (0, σ 2)
and n(1)e ∼ CN (0, σ 2) represent the complex additive white
Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at Ri and E during the first time
slot, respectively.
In vector form, the signals received at all the relays can be
expressed as
yr = √ps,1h1,rs1 + √ps,2h2,rs2 + nr, (3)
where h1,r 
[
h1,1, . . . , h1,N
]T
, h2,r 
[
h2,1, . . . , h2,N
]T
denote the channel vectors between the two sources and the
relays, and nr 
[
nr,1, . . . , nr,N
]T indicates the AWGN vector
at the relay nodes. We assume that each relay node is equipped
with a power splitting device to coordinate harvesting energy
and forwarding the received signal. In particular, the received
signal at the i th relay, Ri , is split such that a ρi ∈ [0, 1]
portion of the signal power is passed to the information
forwarding block and the remaining 1 − ρi portion of the
power is sent to the energy harvesting block of the relay.
Several power splitting schemes have been considered in
the literature [22], [23] including fixed power splitting and
dynamic power splitting. In order to keep our main focus on
mechanism design, we consider fixed power splitting in this
paper. Interested readers are referred to [22] and [23] for more
about the dynamic power splitting schemes.
1Note that the same node performs the transmit power and relay beamform-
ing optimization and/or relay selection operations as well.
From (1), the harvested power at the i th relay node, Ri , is
given by
Ph,i = ξi (1 − ρi )
(
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2
)
, (4)
where ξi ∈ (0, 1] denotes the energy conversion efficiency
of the energy transducers at the i th relay that accounts for
the loss in the energy transducers for converting the harvested
energy to electrical energy to be stored. For convenience, we
assume, without loss of generality, that ξk = 1,∀k, in this
paper. It is worth pointing out that the relays do not need to
convert the received signal from the radio frequency (RF) band
to the baseband in order to harvest the carried energy using
modern energy transducers. Therefore, according to the law
of energy conservation, it is assumed that the total harvested
RF band power (energy normalized by the baseband symbol
period) at each relay is proportional to the normalised energy
of the received baseband signal.
In the second time slot, Ri amplifies the received signal√
ρi yr,i by a complex weighting coefficient f ∗i and then trans-
mits xr,i = √ρi f ∗i yr,i . Combining the transmit signals from
all the relay nodes, we have xr = Fyr where F is the combined
diagonal weight matrix in the form F = diag (f∗), with f [√
ρ1 f1, . . . ,√ρN fN
]T
. Note that for notational simplicity,
the power splitting coefficients have been incorporated in the
definition of the relay beamforming vector f . It is also assumed
that the channel coefficients between the transmitters and the
relays are block-fading reciprocal. The block-fading recipro-
cal channel assumption has been widely used in two-way
relay literature, e.g., [3]–[5]. The assumption essentially means
that channels for the two phases are reciprocal, which is
based on the time division duplex (TDD) operation with
synchronized time-slot. The TDD operation greatly reduces
signalling overhead and leads to an SOCP-based problem
formulation with reduced complexity, which we will elaborate
in section IV. Thus, the received signal at S1 in the second
time slot can be expressed as
ys,1 = hT1,rxr + ns,1 =
√
ps,1hT1,rFh1,rs1
+√ps,2hT1,rFh2,rs2 + hT1,rFnr + ns,1, (5)
where ns,1 ∼ CN (0, σ 2) denotes the AWGN signal at source
node S1.
Similarly, the received signal at S2 can be expressed as
ys,2 = hT2,rxr + ns,2 =
√
ps,1hT2,rFh1,rs1
+√ps,2hT2,rFh2,rs2 + hT2,rFnr + ns,2, (6)
and that at E can be written as
y(2)e = hTr,exr + n(2)e =
√
ps,1hTr,eFh1,rs1
+√ps,2hTr,eFh2,rs2 + hTr,eFnr + n(2)e , (7)
where ns,2 ∼ CN (0, σ 2) and n(2)e ∼ CN (0, σ 2) are the noises
at S2 and E in the second time slot.
Since s1 and s2 are known, respectively, at S1 and S2,
the residual received signals after self-interference cancellation
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(typical for two-way channels) are, respectively, given by
ys,1 = √ps,2 hT1,rFh2,rs2 + hT1,rFnr + ns,1
= √ps,2 f H H1,rh2,rs2 + n¯s,1
= √ps,2 f H h2,1s2 + n¯s,1, (8)
and
ys,2 = √ps,1 hT2,rFh1,rs1 + hT2,rFnr + ns,2
= √ps,1 f H H2,rh1,rs1 + n¯s,2
= √ps,1 f H h1,2s1 + n¯s,2, (9)
where Hi,r  diag(hi,r), h j,i  Hi,rh j,r, for i, j = 1, 2, and
j = i , n¯s,i  hTi,rFnr + ns,i , for i = 1, 2, and we have
used the identity aH diag(b) = bH diag(a). Note that each
transmission phase brings some opportunity for E to overhear
the information. Hence, combining the received signals in (2)
and (7) at E over two time slots, an equivalent multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) channel is formed, i.e.,
[
y(1)e
y(2)e
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ye
=
[ √ps,1h1,e √ps,2h2,e√ps,1f H h¯1,e √ps,2f H h¯2,e
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
He
[
s1
s2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
+
[
n
(1)
e
n¯
(2)
e
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ne
,
(10)
where h¯i,e  Hr,ehi,r , for i = 1, 2, Hr,e  diag(hr,e), and
n¯
(2)
e  hTr,eFnr + n(2)e .
As a result, the corresponding signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
for the equivalent transmission link from S2 to S1 can be
expressed as
γ1 =
ps,2f H h2,1hH2,1f
σ 2
(
f H Cn,1f + 1
) , (11)
where Cn,1  H1,rHH1,r. Similarly, the SNR for the equivalent
transmission link from S1 to S2 is
γ2 =
ps,1f H h1,2hH1,2f
σ 2
(
f H Cn,2f + 1
) (12)
with Cn,2  H2,rHH2,r. Thus, the channel capacities at S1, S2,
and E are given, respectively, by
C1 = 12 log2 (1 + γ1) , (13)
C2 = 12 log2 (1 + γ2) , (14)
and
Ce = 12 log2 det
(
I2 + HeHHe C−1n,e
)
, (15)
where Cn,e  diag
(
σ 2, σ 2
(
1 + f H Hr,ef
))
is the equivalent
noise covariance matrix at the eavesdropper E over the
two time slots and the scalar factor 12 is due to the fact
that two time slots are required in order to accomplish one
successful transmission. Then the achievable secrecy sum rate
is given by [3], [4]
Cs = [C1 + C2 − Ce]+ (16)
where [a]+ = max(0, a). Note that the secrecy sum-rate
in (16) is the sum of secrecy rates provided by all the relay
nodes. Since all the relay nodes may not have sufficiently
strong fading channels in order to make a useful contribution
to the secrecy sum-rate, selecting the appropriate relays as
helpers can play a significant role in improving secrecy per-
formance. In the next section, we will focus on the mechanism
design approach in order to select the K best relays that can
make the most significant contribution.
However, since the relays selected will have greater opportu-
nity2 to harvest energy from the received signal, all the relays
will be naturally interested in participating in the mechanism.
The issue is that some of them may intentionally exaggerate
their true information in order to be selected. We will focus
on the incentive control mechanisms so that the participating
relays are self-enforced to reveal the truth.
III. TRUTH-TELLING MECHANISM DESIGN
This section provides a brief introduction of mechanism
design. A mechanism M is defined by the tuple (S, t1, . . . , tN )
where ti for i = 1, . . . , N, represents the transfer payment of
agent i (or player i )3 when the social choice is S. The transfer
payment is the compensation paid by an agent in return to
the social damage it causes to the others by being selected.
Mechanism design (sometimes called reverse game theory) is
a game theoretical tool that studies solutions for a class of
private information games in order to achieve a specific
system-wide outcome even though the agents are selfish [28].
In a mechanism, each agent reports its private information
(referred to as ‘type’ in the native literature) to the designer
that serves as the parameter of a valuation function quantifying
its bid on a specific allocation outcome and the transfer
payment. The most desirable criteria that the mechanism
designers tend to achieve are incentive compatibility and social
optimality. A mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if
truth-telling becomes the dominant (best) strategy in the mech-
anism while the mechanism is social optimum if it can ensure
the maximum aggregate utilities of all the agents in the system.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [29]–[31] is
well known to achieve these two goals. Hence, we consider
the VCG mechanism in the relay selection problem in order
to maximize the secrecy sum-rate.
A. VCG Mechanism
In the VCG mechanism, agents are the members of the
society. All the agents announce their valuations for the
auctioned items simultaneously. Hence, there is no way to
know whether the agents are telling the truth. The design
objective is to give the agents the right incentives to tell
the truth. The social choice is a set of K agents from a set
of N alternatives for K identical auctioned items. In VCG
mechanism, each winning agent must pay some compensation
2Note that in the proposed beamforming algorithm, the transmitters will
transmit with sufficient power such that the energy harvesting requirements
of all the selected relay nodes are satisfied at least to equality assuming that
the relays report their true channel information.
3In this paper, the terms “player” and “agent” will be used interchangeably.
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(i.e., transfer payment) for the social damage it causes. The
more the damage, the higher is the transfer payoff. We will
now present the framework to quantify how much each agent i
contributes to the rest of the society if selected.
Let vi (X , θi ) denote the valuation by agent i from alter-
native X given the true information θi . We also denote
O(θˆi , θˆ−i ) as the utilitarian alternative (i.e., outcome of the
mechanism) chosen from the available set of alternatives
based on the reported information {θˆi }Ni=1, as opposed to
the true information {θi}Ni=1, where the variable θˆ−i 
{θˆ1, . . . , θˆi−1, θˆi+1, . . . , θˆN } is defined as the set of reported
information of all the agents except agent i . Also, O−i (θˆ j , θˆ− j )
represents the utilitarian alternative when agent i does not
take part in the mechanism. Note that the type profile θˆ 
{θˆ1, . . . , θˆN } is an ordered list in the decreasing manner.
The total welfare of the society (excluding i ) is thus given
by
∑K
j =i v j
(
O(θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
. If agent i were not a member
of the society, then the social welfare would be changed
to
∑K
j=1 v j
(
O−i (θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
. The difference in the social
welfare with and without the presence of agent i is a measure
of how much agent i contributes to the rest of the society.
In the VCG mechanism, agent i receives a monetary transfer
payment equal to the amount it contributes to the rest of the
society. As a result, the VCG mechanism is characterized by
the following monetary transfer payment function
ti (θˆi , θˆ−i ) =
K∑
j =i
v j
(
O(θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
−
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O−i (θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
(17)
=
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O(θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
−
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O−i (θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
− vi
(
O(θˆi , θˆ−i ), θi
)
. (18)
Note that the two summation operations in (17) and (18)
are conducted within two different sets of alternatives
namely O(θˆi , θˆ−i ) and O−i (θˆ j , θˆ− j ). The first sum∑K
j =i v j
(
O(θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
in (13) includes (K − 1) terms
while the second sum
∑K
j=1 v j
(
O−i (θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
includes
K different terms. Thus given a type profile θˆ , the monetary
transfer to agent i is defined by the total value of all agents
other than i when agent i is present in the system minus the
total value of all agents when agent i is absent in the system.
The value is always negative since the sum of apparently
(in absence of the i th item) highest K valuations is subtracted
from the sum of the highest (K − 1) valuations. Note that
the transfer payment of agent i is independent of its own
valuation vi . The difference of the first two terms in (18)
represents the marginal contribution of agent i to the system
which is given as a discount to agent i by the VCG payment
mechanism. It is evident from (18) that all the K winning
bidders pay a social damage recovery payment equal to the
highest non-winning (i.e., the (K + 1)-st) bid, whereas a
losing bidder pays nothing, i.e.,
ti (θˆi , θˆ−i )
=
{
−vK+1
(
O(θˆ j , θˆ− j ), θ j
)
, for k = 1, . . . , K ,
0, for k = K + 1, . . . , N.
(19)
In the VCG mechanism, the highest K bidders win and the
winning bidder i attains a utility (payoff) of
ui
(
θˆi , θˆ−i
)
= vi
(
O
(
θˆi , θˆ−i
)
, θi
)
+ ti
(
θˆi , θˆ−i
)
(20)
=
K∑
i=1
vi
(
O
(
θˆi , θˆ−i
)
, θi
)
−
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O−i
(
θˆ j , θˆ− j
)
, θ j
)
. (21)
Note that the penalty method to prevent reporting false
information by agent i is imposed by the transfer payment
ti
(
θˆi , θˆ−i
)
in (20) which distinguishes mechanism design
from conventional game theory. In conventional game theory,
the agents can exaggerate their private information arbitrarily
in order to be selected such that their own payoff is maximized.
But in the VCG mechanism, the transfer payment will penalize
them if they do so. Thus the selected utilitarian alternative
maximizes the sum of the announced valuations, i.e.,
K∑
i=1
vi
(
O
(
θˆi , θˆ−i
)
, θi
)
≥
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O−i
(
θˆ j , θˆ− j
)
, θ j
)
,
where the equality holds only when all the agents reveal
their true private information. Let us now elaborate the VCG
payment mechanism through a simple numerical example.
Example 1 VCG Transfer Payment: Consider five agents
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with valuations v1 = 22, v2 = 18, v3 = 15,
v4 = 12 and v5 = 8 participating in a sealed bid auction
for three identical items available for auction. Each bidder
can bid for one item only. Applying the VCG mechanism,
bidders 1, 2, and 3 should win since their bids confirm the
maximum social welfare (22 + 18 + 15 = 55). The transfer
payment by bidder 1 is calculated as
t1
(
θˆ1, θˆ−1
)
=
3∑
j =1
v j
(
O
(
θˆ j , θˆ− j
)
, θ j
)
−
3∑
j=1
v j
(
O−1
(
θˆ j , θˆ− j
)
, θ j
)
= (18 + 15) − (18 + 15 + 12)
= −12.
Thus bidder 1 pays an amount (12) equal to the highest
non-winning bid v4 = 12 for the social damage caused
by its selection. Similarly, the transfer payments paid by
bidders 2 and 3 both equal to 12. Note that the payments are
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consistent with their respective marginal contributions. The
marginal contribution of agent 1 is given by
3∑
j=1
v j
(
O
(
θˆ j , θˆ− j
)
, θ j
)
−
3∑
j=1
v j
(
O−1
(
θˆ j , θˆ− j
)
, θ j
)
= (22 + 18 + 15) − (18 + 15 + 12)
= 10
which is given as a discount to agent 1 resulting in a transfer
payment of 10 − 22 = −12. Similarly, the marginal contribu-
tion of agents 2 and 3 can be computed as (22 + 18 + 15) −
(22 + 15 + 12) = 6 and (22 + 18 + 15)− (22 + 18 + 12) = 3.
Thus the utilities of the agents can be computed as u1 =
22 − 12 = 10, u2 = 18 − 12 = 6, u3 = 15 − 12 = 3, u4 = 0,
u5 = 0.
Let us now assume that agent 4 announces an exaggerated
valuation of v4 = 22, as opposed to its true valuation 12, with a
desire to win. Thus the agents {1, 2, 4} win and their transfer
payments can be obtained as t1 = t2 = t4 = −15, which
is equal to the highest non-winning bid. The corresponding
payoffs of the winning bids are computed as u1 = 22−15 = 7,
u2 = 18 − 15 = 3, u4 = 12 − 15 = −3. Note that a
negative utility of agent 4 indicates that the agent must pay
additional amount from its own pocket in order to comply
with the auction rules. Now the total social welfare counts to∑5
i=1 ui = 7 + 3 − 3 + 0 + 0 = 7 as opposed to 19 if all the
agents would have announced their true valuations. Thus the
VCG mechanism gives the incentives that if any of the agents
announces untrue valuation, that may damage the total social
benefit as well as its own utility. 
In the following, we apply the VCG mechanism for relay
selection in a two-way communication system in presence of
an eavesdropper.
B. VCG Mechanism for Relay Selection
We consider the channel coefficients of each relay node
with the two source nodes and the eavesdropping node as the
private information of that relay node. The relay nodes report
their channel information gˆi  {hˆ1,i , hˆ2,i , hˆe,i } to the source
nodes (or the mechanism designer) simultaneously. Through
reporting their CSI, the relay nodes actually commit to the
mechanism designer the level of secrecy rates they can provide
for the two source nodes. We assume that the selected relay
nodes must keep their commitments during their transmission
in the second phase. Although the reported information may
not be the same as the true ones, the mechanism designer will
select the relays treating them as true. Let gi  {h1,i , h2,i , he,i }
denote Ri ’s true channel information and Ci,s(gi) denote
the achievable secrecy sum rate through relay Ri . Note that
the information leakage during the first time slot is not
affected by the social choice of relays and we assume that
the relays do cooperative null space beamforming towards the
eavesdropper’s channel.4 Hence, Ci,s(gi) can be defined as a
function of the equivalent two-way single-input single-output
(SISO) channel only. After removing the self-interference, the
4This will be elaborated in Section IV
equivalent SISO channel from S2 to S1 via Ri can be modelled
as
y˜s,1 = αi√pr ps,2h1,i h2,i s2 + αi√prh1,i nr,i + ns,1 (22)
and that from S1 to S2 is given by
y˜s,2 = αi√pr ps,1h2,i h1,i s1 + αi√prh2,i nr,i + ns,2, (23)
where αi 
(
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2
)− 12 is the ampli-
fication factor satisfying the power constraint at relay i and
pr is the available relay power budget. Thus Ri ’s independent
valuation can be defined as
vi (gi)  Ci,s (gi) = 12
[
log2
(
1+ α
2
i pr ps,1|h1,i |2|h2,i |2
σ 2
(
α2i pr|h1,i |2+1
)
)
+ log2
(
1+α
2
i pr ps,2|h2,i |2|h1,i |2
σ 2
(
α2i pr|h2,i |2+1
)
)]
. (24)
Note that by dividing the numerator and the denominator of
both logarithmic terms in (24) by α2i pr, Ci,s (gi ) can be shown
as an increasing function of ps,1, ps,2 and pr. Hence during
the mechanism design phase, we obtain Ci,s(gi) assuming
ps,1, ps,2 and pr hold their maximum possible value. Thus the
utilitarian alternative O
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
based on the reported channel
information can be defined as
O
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
 arg max
{Rk}
K∑
k=1
Ci,s(gˆi ). (25)
Note that based on the definitions of the two sets O(·) and
O−i (·), the output in (25) of the proposed mechanism design
is a set {Rk} of K relay nodes.
Let us define that πi is the average harvested power (price
paid) against per unit of secrecy rate achieved by relay i . It is
worth mentioning that the unit price πi may vary amongst the
relays depending on their channel fading conditions. Thus the
utility of Ri can be defined independently as
ui
(
gˆi
) =
{
πi Ci,s
(
gˆi
)
, if Ri is selected,
0, otherwise.
(26)
Note that in the existing game-theoretic approaches adopted
in secrecy communication, the agents receive some virtual pay-
ment usually in terms of secrecy rate or transmit power [19],
which has no operational meaning to them. However, we
propose the utility to be paid through some physical entity
(e.g., harvested energy) for the first time. In this paper, we
assume that only the relay nodes selected by the mechanism
designer can get payoff i.e., harvest required energy from the
first time slot. Although this may not always be the case
in practice, it is a valid (reasonable) assumption since the
mechanism designer selects the relays with the best channel
conditions. Essentially, the unselected relay nodes, which have
worse channel conditions as guaranteed by the proposed mech-
anism design, will harvest almost nothing. Applying energy
beamforming5 [24] at both transmitting nodes, one can fully
guarantee that the unselected relays will not be able to harvest
5We do not consider energy beamforming in this paper. Readers are referred
to [24] and [27] for energy beamforming strategies.
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any energy from the transmitters’ signals. However, designing
such spatially selective energy beamforming is a complicated
task [12], [24], [27] and requires additional resources (e.g.,
physical antennas) at the two transmitters, which is not com-
patible with the system settings (single-antenna transmitters)
considered in this paper. Hence, in order to keep the main
focus of this paper on mechanism design, we would like to
leave transmit energy beamforming design as a potential future
work. Since only the selected relay nodes can get payoff, some
dishonest relays may exaggerate their channel information in
order to create greater opportunity to be selected. This may
result in an unfair selection and damage the expected payoff
of the unselected relay nodes. Essentially, this will adversely
affect the secrecy sum rate and no equilibrium can be achieved
under this condition [19], [30]. Hence we aim at designing a
useful mechanism that can assist in controlling the incentives
of the relays through imposing some penalty functions for
the dishonest relay nodes. The penalty function will ensure
that if any relay node is selected based on its exaggerated
channel information, it will pay more transfer payment for the
social damage caused from its own source of power in order
to guarantee the required level of secrecy rate at each source
node.
In order to better clarify the motivation that drives the relays
to exaggerate their true valuations (i.e., CSI in this case),
we introduce the probability of being selected affecting their
valuation decision. The higher the valuation, the higher the
probability of being selected, and so is the expected payoff.
In this context, we assume that the relay nodes do not know
the channel information of the other relays before they actually
enact their channel information but generally know that the
secrecy rate of each relay obeys certain probability density
function
(
0 ≤ Ci,s(gi) < ∞
)
. Thus we define the reported
valuation of Ri as
vi
(
O(gˆi , gˆ−i ), gi
)
 Ci,s
(
gˆi
)
Pr (Ri being selected) , (27)
where Pr(A) indicates the probability that the event A occurs.
Accordingly, the expected payoff of Ri can be defined as
u˜i
(
gˆi
)
 πi Ci,s
(
gˆi
)
Pr (Ri being selected) . (28)
Given the relay selection criterion (25), the natural incentive
of a relay would thus be to exaggerate its achievable secrecy
rate Ci,s
(
gˆi
)
to ∞ in order to get the maximum expected
payoff, which eventually increases their probability of being
selected. Hence we introduce the following VCG transfer
payment function
ti
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
) =
K∑
j =i
v j
(
O
(
gˆ j , gˆ− j
)
, g j
)
−
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O−i
(
gˆ j , gˆ− j
)
, g j
)
, (29)
where O−i (·) is the relay selection outcome when Ri does
not participate in the mechanism. It is obvious from (29) that
if a relay node claims a higher secrecy rate by tempering
hˆ1,i or hˆ2,i , it may have more chances to be selected, but
runs the risk of paying extra transfer payoff through spending
from its own source of power.6 On the other hand, if a relay
node reports a lower secrecy rate, it will receive a higher
monetary compensation but at the cost of lower probability
to be selected. Hence truth-telling is the dominant strategy in
the proposed VCG mechanism. The idea will be elaborated in
Section V through numerical examples. In the VCG mecha-
nism based relay selection algorithm, the total payoff of Ri is
given by
ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
) = vi
(
O
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
, gi
) + ti
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
=
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O
(
gˆ j , gˆ− j
)
, g j
)
−
K∑
j=1
v j
(
O−i
(
gˆ j , gˆ− j
)
, g j
)
. (30)
The following theorem describes the strength of the VCG
mechanism for relay selection.
Theorem 1: Announcing truthfully, i.e., gˆi = gi is a domi-
nant strategy for each relay i .
Proof: We need to prove that announcing gˆi = gi is
the best strategy for relay i no matter what other relays
announce. If relay Ri announces gˆi and others announce gˆ−i ,
then according to (30), Ri ’s utility is ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
) =
vi
(
O(gˆi , gˆ−i ), gi
) + ∑Kj =i v j
(
O(gˆ j , gˆ− j ), g j
) −
∑K
j=1 v j
(
O−i (gˆ j , gˆ− j ), g j
)
. Relay i has to decide which gˆi
to announce; however, it cannot determine O−i (gˆ j , gˆ− j ) since
it is excluded from that society. Hence, we can ignore the last
term in ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
as it is unaffected by Ri ’s announcement.
Therefore, in order to maximize its own payoff, relay Ri aims
to maximize the total utility of the society inclusive of itself.
Since relay Ri cannot choose other relays’ announcements, it
can only play its own part. That is, by truthfully announcing,
gˆi = gi , it can ensure that O(gi , gˆ−i ) will be chosen. Hence
announcing truthfully is the best thing relay Ri can do. 
Note that each relay node competing to be selected will have
the same incentive to report its true CSI and the K relays that
can achieve the top K secrecy rates will be selected which
will eventually maximize the total payoff. Thus equilibrium is
achieved under this condition.
Interestingly, the only additional task for implementing
the proposed mechanism in relay selection, as opposed to
conventional relay selection, is the calculation of the transfer
payments, which involves simple mathematical operations.
In return, the benefit is that the mechanism enforces the relays
to reveal their true CSI. No additional signalling is needed
since the node performing the optimization and/or relay selec-
tion can effectively implement the mechanism. A quantitative
comparison of benefits has been provided in Example 1.
As demonstrated in the example, if agent 4 announces an
exaggerated valuation, the total social welfare counts to 7 as
opposed to 19 if all the agents would have announced their
true valuations. Thus the VCG mechanism gives the incentives
that if any of the agents announces untrue valuation, that may
damage the total social benefit as well as its own utility.
6The exact mechanism to implement this will be discussed in Section IV.
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Once the best relays are selected based on their reported
channel information, the optimization of the transmit power
and cooperative relay beamforming is conducted, which we
discuss in the next section.
IV. OPTIMAL TRANSMIT POWER AND RELAY
BEAMFORMING DESIGN
In this section, we propose transmit power and cooperative
relay beamforming optimization schemes assuming that full
CSI of all the nodes is available. Although in some practical
communication systems, obtaining the eavesdropper’s CSI
can be very difficult (or even impossible), for the ease of
exposition, we assume that the relays know their channels
with the transmitters as well as the eavesdropper. This is a
reasonable assumption for scenarios where the eavesdropper
is an active user of the system, and the transmitter aims
to provide different services to different types of users. For
such active eavesdroppers, the CSI can be estimated from
the eavesdropper’s transmission. Let us define Pb,i  Ph,i −
| fi |2
(
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2
)
as the net power to be
stored in the battery of the i th relay. The overall objective is to
increase C1 and C2 as well as Pb,i as much as possible while
keeping Ce as small as possible under peak power constraints
at the two transmitters as well as each relay node. Hence we
formulate the following optimization problem
max
ps,1,ps,2,f
[C1 + C2 − Ce]+ + min
i
Pb,i (31a)
s.t. Ph,i ≥ ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
, for i = 1, . . . , K , (31b)
| fi |2
(
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2
)
≤ pr,
for i = 1, . . . , K , (31c)
ps,1 ≤ Pmax, ps,2 ≤ Pmax. (31d)
Here Pmax and pr are the available power budgets at the
two sources and each of the relay nodes, respectively. Note
that the last term in (31a) indicates the saved power of the
worst selected relay. In general, it may happen that Pb,i is
negative, which essentially means that the i th selected relay
may need to contribute additional power from its own storage
in order to maintain its reported secrecy rate. However, the
constraint (31b) ensures that each of the selected relays gets
its appropriate payoff. To guarantee that the relay nodes
do not need to use their own source of power, they may
set pr ≤ ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
. Then the constraints (31b) and (31c)
jointly guarantee that the honest selected relays can harvest
sufficient energy required for their transmission in the second
phase. However, there is no guarantee that a dishonest relay
will be able to harvest appropriate amount of energy since
they likely have weaker fading channels than what they have
reported. Since we assume that the selected relays transmit
with sufficient power during the second phase such that their
promised secrecy rates at two sources are maintained, only
the honest relay nodes do not need to utilize their own source
of power. Although ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
can assume any value in
a general sense, we obtain ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
from (30) assuming
ps,1 = ps,2 = Pmax.
Note that the objective function in (31a) includes the
product of three correlated Rayleigh quotients, which is neither
convex, nor concave, and is in general very difficult to solve.
However, a more tractable but suboptimal strategy for design-
ing beamforming is to choose the beamforming vector lying in
the null space of the eavesdropper’s channel in the second time
slot. The corresponding beamforming optimization problem is
to maximize the sum rate achieved at two sources instead of
sum secrecy rate. Because we cannot cancel the information
rate leakage to the eavesdropper during the first time slot, the
impact of the eavesdropper’s achievable information rate on
the secrecy sum rate should be considered when optimizing
the beamforming vector as well as two source powers. As such,
we can try to degrade the eavesdropper’s interception by
constraining its maximum allowable information rate with a
predetermined level re, which can help avoid dealing with
the rate difference of concave functions in (31a). If the relay
nodes choose the beamforming vector f lying in the null
space of the eavesdropper’s equivalent channel vectors, then
the information leackage in the second phase is completely
eliminated, i.e., f H h¯1,e = f H h¯2,e = 0 so that the second row
of He in (10) can be eliminated. Thus Ce reduces to
Ce = 12 log2
(
1 + ps,1|h1,e|
2 + ps,2|h2,e|2
σ 2
)
. (32)
Introducing a real-valued slack variable ν, we reformulate
problem (31) as
max
ps,1,ps,2,f,ν
1
2
log2
(
1 + ps,2f
H h2,1hH2,1f
σ 2
(
1 + f H Cn,1f
)
)
+ 1
2
log2
(
1 + ps,1f
H h1,2hH1,2f
σ 2
(
1 + f H Cn,2f
)
)
+ ν (33a)
s.t.
1
2
log2
(
1 + ps,1|h1,e|
2 + ps,2|h2,e|2
σ 2
)
≤ re (33b)
(1 − ρi )
(
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2
)
≥ ui
× (gˆi , gˆ−i
)
, for i = 1, . . . , K , (33c)
| fi |2
(
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2
)
≤ pr,
for i = 1, . . . , K , (33d)
Pb,i ≥ ν, for i = 1, . . . , K , (33e)
ps,1 ≤ Pmax, ps,2 ≤ Pmax, (33f)
where f = H¯†e f¯ , f¯ is any vector, H¯†e is the projection matrix
onto the null space of H¯e 
[
h¯1,e, h¯2,e
]
, the columns of which
constitute the orthogonal basis for the null space of H¯e. Note
that from (33d), the transmit power of the i th relay node can
be expressed as
[
ff H
]
i,i [Rs]i,i with Rs = ps,1H1,rHH1,r +
ps,2H2,rHH2,r + σ 2IK . Also, for given ps,1 and ps,2, we can
see from (33) that (33b), (33c), and (33f) are irrelevant to f .
However, the problem is still non-convex since the objective
function is not concave. Hence we split the objective function
and formulate the following relay beamforming optimization
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problem
max
f,r0,ν
r0 + ν (34a)
s.t.
1
2
log2
(
1 + ps,2f
H h2,1hH2,1f
σ 2
(
1 + f H Cn,1f
)
)
≥ βr0 (34b)
1
2
log2
(
1 + ps,1f
H h1,2hH1,2f
σ 2
(
1 + f H Cn,2f
)
)
≥ (1 − β)r0 (34c)
[
ff H
]
i,i
[Rs]i,i ≤ pr, for i = 1, . . . , K , (34d)
(
1 − ρi −
[
ff H
]
i,i
)
[Rs]i,i ≥ ν, for i = 1, . . . , K ,
(34e)
where r0 is the objective value for the sum rate in (33a) and
β ∈ [0, 1] is the rate splitting coefficient. The optimal solution
of the problem can be found in two steps. First we solve
problem (34) for a feasible r0 to obtain f . Then we perform
a one-dimensional search on β to find the maximum r0 for
which problem (34) is feasible. The lower bound of the rate
search is definitely 0. However, to define the upper bound rmax,
we first decouple the two-way relay channel into two one-way
relay channels and obtain the rate ri of each one-way channel.
Then the upper limit can be defined as rmax = 2×max(r1, r2).
Let us now substitute f = H¯†e f¯ in (34) to obtain
max
f¯,r0,ν
r0 + ν (35a)
s.t.
f¯ H H¯†He h2,1hH2,1H¯
†
e f¯
1 + f¯ H H¯†He Cn,1H¯†e f¯
≥ σ
2
ps,2
(
22βr0 − 1
)
, (35b)
f¯ H H¯†He h1,2hH1,2H¯
†
e f¯
1 + f¯ H H¯†He Cn,2H¯†e f¯
≥ σ
2
ps,1
(
22(1−β)r0 − 1
)
, (35c)
[
H¯†e f¯ f¯ H H¯†He
]
i,i
[Rs]i,i ≤ pr, for i = 1, . . . , K , (35d)
(
1−ρi −
[
H¯†e f¯ f¯ H H¯†He
]
i,i
)
[Rs]i,i ≥ ν, for i =1, . . . , K .
(35e)
Problem (35) is a non-convex quadratically constrained
quadratic programming (QCQP) problem which is N P-hard
in general. We reformulate problem (35) as follows:
max
f¯,r0,ν
r0 + ν (36a)
s.t.
∣
∣
∣f¯ H H¯†He h2,1
∣
∣
∣
2 ≥ η1
∥
∥
∥
∥
[√
Cn,1H¯†e f¯
1
]∥∥
∥
∥
2
, (36b)
∣
∣
∣f¯ H H¯†He h1,2
∣
∣
∣
2 ≥ η2
∥
∥
∥
∥
[√
Cn,2H¯†e f¯
1
]∥∥
∥
∥
2
, (36c)
∣
∣∣H¯†(i)e f¯
∣
∣∣
2 ≤ pr[Rs]i,i , for i = 1, . . . , K , (36d)
∣
∣∣H¯†(i)e f¯
∣
∣∣
2 ≤ 1 − ρi − ν[Rs]i,i , for i = 1, . . . , K ,
(36e)
where η1  σ 2
(
22βr0 − 1) /ps,2, η2  σ 2
(
22(1−β)r0 − 1) /
ps,1,
√
Cn,i is the element-wise square root of Cn,i , and H¯†(i)e
indicates the i th row of H¯†e . Since the constraints in (36) are
expressed in terms of Euclidean vector norms, multiplying the
optimal f¯ by an arbitrary phase shift e jφ will not affect the
constraints. Also, by definition, h2,1 and h1,2 yield identical
numeric value. Therefore, f¯ H H¯†He hi, j can be considered as a
real number, without loss of generality. Consequently, (36) can
be rewritten as
max
f˜,r0,ν
r0 + ν (37a)
s.t.
∥
∥
∥C˜n,1f˜
∥
∥
∥ ≤ 1√
η1
h˜H2,1f˜, (37b)
∥
∥∥C˜n,2f˜
∥
∥∥ ≤ 1√
η2
h˜H1,2 f˜, (37c)
∣
∣
∣h˜He,i f˜
∣
∣
∣ ≤
√ pr
[Rs]i,i
, for i = 1, . . . , K , (37d)
∣
∣
∣h˜He,i f˜
∣
∣
∣ ≤
√
1 − ρi − ν[Rs]i,i , for i = 1, . . . , K ,
(37e)
where f˜ 
[
f¯T , 1
]T
, h˜Hi, j =
[(
H¯†He hi, j
)H
, 0
]
, h˜e,i =
[
H¯†(i)e , 0
]T
, and C˜n,i =
[√
Cn,i H¯†He 0
0 1
]
. Note that (37) is
a standard SOCP problem which can be efficiently solved by
interior point methods [32]. Once the optimal relay beamform-
ing vector f is obtained, we formulate the following problem
using the monotonic property of the log function to find the
optimal ps,1 and ps,2:
max
ps,1,ps,2,ν
μ1 ps,1 + μ2 ps,2 + ν, (38a)
s.t. ps,1|h1,e|2 + ps,2|h2,e|2 ≤ σ 2
(
22re − 1
)
, (38b)
(1 − ρi )
(
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2
)
≥ ui
(
gˆi , gˆ−i
)
, for i = 1, . . . , K , (38c)
ps,1|h1,i |2 + ps,2|h2,i |2 + σ 2 ≤ pr| fi |2 ,
for i = 1, . . . , K , (38d)
(
1−ρi −| fi |2
) (
ps,1|h1,i |2+ ps,2|h2,i |2+σ 2
)
≥ ν,
for i = 1, . . . , K , (38e)
ps,1 ≤ Pmax, ps,2 ≤ Pmax, (38f)
where μi = f
H hi, j hHi, j f
σ 2(1+f H Cn, j f) , i, j = 1, 2, i = j . The prob-
lem (38) is convex for given ρi and hence the globally optimal
solution can be easily obtained using existing solvers [33].
Thus we update the relay beamforming vector f and the
transmit powers ps,1 and ps,2 alternatingly. Since we solve a
convex subproblem at each step of the alternating algorithm,
the objective function can either increase or maintain, but
cannot decrease at each step of the algorithm. A monotonic
convergence follows directly from this observation. The algo-
rithm is summarized in Table I.
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TABLE I
PROPOSED ALTERNATING ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING PROBLEM (31)
A. Complexity of the Algorithm
We now focus on the computational complexity of the
proposed optimization scheme. We analyze the complexity
of the alternating algorithm step-by-step. Note that the relay
beamforming optimization problem (37) involves only SOC
constraints, and hence can be solved using standard interior-
point methods (IPM) [34, Lecture 6]. Therefore, we can use
the worst-case computation time of IPM to analyze the com-
plexity of the proposed method. Now the overall complexity of
the IPM for solving an SOCP problem containing p constraints
consists of two components:
a) Iteration Complexity: The number of iterations required
to reach an -accurate ( > 0) optimal solution is in the
order of ln(1/)
√
β(K ), where β(K ) = 2 p is known to
be the barrier parameter.
b) Per-Iteration Computation Cost: A system of n linear
equations is required to be solved in each iteration where
n is the number of decision variables. The computation
tasks include the formation of the coefficient matrix H
of the system of linear equations and the factorization
of H. The cost of forming H sums on the order of κfor =
n
∑p
j=1 k2j , k j is the dimension of the j th cone, while the
cost of factorization is on the order of κfac = n3 [34].
Thus the overall computation cost for solving the problem
using IPM is on the order of ln(1/)
√
β(K ) × (κfor + κfac).
Using these concepts, we can now analyze the computa-
tional complexity of problem (37). Note that the number
of decision variables n is on the order of K (ignoring the
slack variables). Now, the problem (37) has p = (2K + 2)
SOC constraints. Thus the complexity of solving prob-
lem (37) is on the order of 4K√(K + 1)O(K )[(K + 1)2 +
K 2 + 1] ln(1/).
In the next step of the algorithm, problem (38) is solve,
which is a linear programming problem. Now the linear
program (38) can be solved in polynomial time at a worst-
case complexity of O
(
33.5(3K + 3)2) [35].
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we study the performance of the pro-
posed mechanism design and joint source-relay optimization
algorithm for a two-way relay system through numerical
simulations. We simulate a flat Rayleigh fading environment
where the channel coefficients are randomly generated as zero-
mean and unit-variance complex Gaussian random variables.
The noise variance σ 2 is assumed to be unity. For simplicity,
the power splitting coefficient ρi ,∀i , is fixed at 0.5.
In the first few examples, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of the VCG mechanism in self-enforcing truth-telling. Then we
Fig. 2. Payoff in terms of harvested power (W) versus reported value xi
using VCG mechanism.
provide performance comparison of the proposed joint trans-
mit power and cooperative relay beamforming optimization
with some conventional schemes.
For the demonstration of the mechanism design exam-
ples, we assign randomly generated values vi (gi) instead of
calculating Ci,s,∀i, which does not affect the relay selection
mechanism. It is assumed that although relay i does not know
other relays’ reported valuation, it knows that every reported
value v−i (g−i) obeys the probability density function e−xi
where the random variable xi  v−i (g−i ), xi ∈ [0,∞) and∫ +∞
0 e
−xi dxi = 1. For simplicity, it is assumed that the price
paid per unit of secrecy rate is πi = 1, ∀i .
In Fig. 2, we illustrate how the VCG mechanism
works using randomly generated true values of xi ’s as
{1.1101, 1.4321, 0.4567, 0.3690, 0.8421} where the mecha-
nism is to select K = 3 relays from N = 5 alternatives. The
payoff of each relay node is plotted versus reported xi values.
Note that if all the relays report their true values, then R1, R2,
and R5 will be selected and they get their maximum payoff
at their true reported values of 1.1101, 1.4321, and 0.8421.
It can be observed from Fig. 2 that both R1, R2, and R5
start receiving positive payoff only after their reported values
exceed the highest of the unselected relays’ reported values
since their selection is not guaranteed otherwise. Also, if either
R3 or R4 reports a value higher than that of R5 (0.8421),
it will be selected instead of R5. At that point, the selected
relay gets a negative payment which indicates that it needs to
use its own source of transmit power for relaying the signal,
since it cannot harvest sufficient power due to a poorer actual
channel. It is also evident from Fig. 2 that as long as a relay
is not selected, it gets (or pays) nothing.
In the next example, we show the effect of exaggerated
reported value by a particular relay (R3) which is likely to
be unselected based on its true channel information assuming
that other relays report their true information. Results in Fig. 3
illustrate the fact that the exaggerated reported value of R3
damages not only its own payoff if selected, but also that of
the other relay nodes, which essentially damages the overall
system payoff. As discussed in Section III-A, this is due to
the fact that the exaggerated reported value of R3 keeps a
potential candidate (R5 in this case) unselected, which results
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Fig. 3. Actual payoff of the relays versus reported value of R3.
Fig. 4. Expected payoff of each relay node versus reported value xi .
in a higher transfer payment of the selected relays. As soon
as the reported value of R3 exceeds that of R5, it is selected
but receives a negative payoff. However, the payoff of R3 is
always unaffected since there are always some higher reported
values than that of R3.
Note that the results in Figs. 2 and 3 represent the exact
payoffs of the relay nodes without taking the probability
of being selected into consideration. Hence the payoff of
any relay was zero if unselected. However, relays may take
the probability of being selected into consideration when
deciding which value to report. That will essentially affect
their expected payoff as well. In the next example, we
intend to show that truth-telling is the best strategy for
the relays through their expected payoff where we want to
select K = 3 relays from N = 5 alternatives. Results
in Fig. 4 show the expected payoff of the relays when
their reported values follow negative exponential probabil-
ity distribution assuming their true affordable secrecy rate
of {1.1101, 1.4321, 0.4567, 0.3690, 0.8421}. We consider a
large number (105) of sample values to calculate the average
expected payoff of each relay node at any given reported
value. It is now more clearly indicated in Fig. 4 that truth-
telling is the dominant strategy in VCG mechanism. Any agent
can expect its maximum payoff only when it reports its true
channel information. We can also observe that the larger the
true secrecy value of a relay node, the higher the expected
payoff. Also, the maximum expected payoff of any relay node
Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy sum rate versus maximum transmit power with
N = 8 and K = 3, 4.
is actually less than ui
(
gˆi
)
which is because each selected
relay node has to pay a mandatory transfer payment as a
recovery for the social damage caused by its selection.
The above numerical examples reveal that the VCG mech-
anism gives the right incentive to the bidders in an auction
to disclose their true valuation. Given the mechanism has
been implemented perfectly, we now focus on the joint trans-
mit power and cooperative relay beamforming optimization.
In order to demonstrate the gain achieved by the proposed
SOCP-based joint transmit power and relay beamforming
algorithm, we compare the secrecy sum-rate performance of
the proposed joint optimization algorithm with that of the
relay-only optimization and the conventional randomization-
guided semidefinite relaxation (SDR) schemes [36], [37] in
the next example. In the relay-only optimization scheme, the
two source nodes transmit at fixed power (not optimized). That
is, we solve problem (37) with fixed ps,1 = ps,2 = PmaxK+2 . Note
that relay-only optimization is considered for the SDR scheme
as well.
In Fig. 5, we compare the secrecy sum rate performance
of the proposed algorithm (‘Joint opt.’ in the figure) with
the relay-only optimization (‘Relay-only opt.’), and the SDR
method of relay beamforming design followed by randomiza-
tion technique (‘SDR approach’). In this example, we select
K = 3 and 4 relays from a set of N = 8 alternatives. Note
that we initialize the algorithm in Section IV with ps,1 =
ps,2 = pr = PmaxK+2 and update the transmit powers and relay
beamforming vector alternatingly. For updating the transmit
powers, we set the tolerable information leakage threshold
re = 1 (bps/Hz). Fig. 5 shows the performance improvement
by the proposed joint optimization algorithm compared to the
other two schemes. Since in the randomization approach, some
of the constraints may be violated, the performance of the SDR
algorithm is severely degraded. For example, at Pmax = 10 dB,
the proposed relay-only optimization algorithm achieves more
than 1 bps/Hz higher secrecy sum rate than the randomization
approach.
Finally, we show the convergence of the proposed alternat-
ing algorithm by evaluating the number of iterations required
to converge to an accuracy of 10−3. We generated four
random channel realizations (Channels- 1, 2, 3, 4) and solved
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Fig. 6. Convergence of the proposed two-way relay beamforming algorithm
with N = 5 and K = 2.
problem (31). Fig. 6 shows the convergence of the secrecy sum
rate maximization problem in different channel realizations
with an initial ps,1 = ps,2 = Pmax for N = 5 and K = 2.
It can be observed that the proposed algorithm achieves a fast
convergence in various channel scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered two-way secret communica-
tions via energy harvesting relay nodes. In order to maximize
the secrecy rate, the source nodes selected the most suitable
relay nodes from the available alternatives. The selected relay
nodes, in return, could harvest energy which is guaranteed
at least to the minimum payoff level. A self-enforcing truth-
telling mechanism design approach was adopted for the relay
selection procedure that guarantees that the relays will not
exaggerate their true information in order to be selected to
gain illegal payoff. We then proposed a joint cooperative relay
beamforming and transmission power optimization algorithm
in order to maximize the achievable sum secrecy rate. Design-
ing strategies for dedicated transmit energy beamforming can
be an interesting future work.
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